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THE ROLE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN BUREAU OF RACIAL AFFAIRS (SABRA) 
IN THE FORMULATION OF APARTHEID IDEOLOGY, 1948-1961 
John Lazar 
The shock victory of the Nationalist Party (NP) in the 1948 general election placed 
"apartheid" - the Party's primary mobilizing slogan - at the centre of the South 
African political stage. For many, 1948 has become the year in which nationalist 
Afrikaners, and particularly Dr H F Verwoerd, began systematically to carry out 
their comprehensive "Master Plan" for a racially divided South Africa. (1) One of 
the contentions of this paper, however, is that, while the NP had, in the period 
leading up to the 1948 election, formulated and sloganized the general fundamentals 
of apartheid, there was still much confusion and debate in Afrikaner circles as to 
apartheid's long-term implications and practical implementation. To treat 
ftAfrikanerdom" as a consistently monolithic, unified ethnic entity, unaffected by 
the shifting constraints and contradictions of the South African political economy, 
and to assume that apartheid was, concomitantly, an ideological "blueprint" with 
exactly the same meaning for the various class factions constituting the NP1s 
electoral alliance, is therefore an inadequate starting point for a complete 
understanding of the apartheid era. (2) But it is equally simplistic to argue, as 
certain revisionist South African theorists have done, that apartheid can be 
analysed in terms of the development of capitalist accumulation and class formation: 
that, in fact, NP policy during the 1950s merely "prepared the ground for the 
establishment of the hegemony of monopoly capital". (3) 
An examination of developments within the South African Bureau of Racial 
Affairs (Sabra) in the decade following the NP's 1948 election victory clearly 
demonstrates the problems with both of these positions. For a rc?construction of 
Sabra's history underlines, on the one hand, that apartheid ideology was a complex, 
often contradictory mix of both short-term pragmatism and general ideological 
thrust; but it also illustrates, on the other hand, that, while apartheid did 
evolve, in many ways, as a result of significant conflicts between the various 
factions of Afrikanerdom, those conflicts cannot always be reduced to class 
differences. 
Sabra was formally launched in Stellenbosch, in September 1948, as an academic 
institution attached to Stellenbosch University. Despite its Broederbond-inspired 
origins and its obvious connections with the higher echelons of the NP, Sabra 
insisted from the outset that it was totally independent of any other organization 
or political party. (4) Sabra's intellectuals began their work by attempting to 
make propaganda interventions in the general debate on apartheid. In the very first 
issue of its Journal of Racial Affairs (JRA), an article by Sabra member W' E Barker 
starkly presented apartheid as the sole solution to South Africa's race relations 
problem. The alternative - the United Party's policy of "drift" - would lead to 
integration, which would, in turn, necessarily result in the destruction of the 
white race. (5) This argument was constantly repeated in the JRA and other.Sabra 
publications. Barker's article was closely followed, for example, by a Sabra 
pamphlet entitled Itseparation or Integration?", which vehemently attacked the 
"dishonesty" and Himmorality" of the integrationistsf position (6), as did the 
"Integration or Separate Development?" pamphlet of 1952: 
The integration policy is dishonest towards the Bantu 
population because it creates the impression that 
their political demands will be fully satisfied, when 
in fact the integration supporters are well aware that 
the Europeans will never allow such a development to 
take place, since their political leadership must of 
necessity be threatened by it. ( 7 )  
At the same time, Sabra did not limit itself to scathing polemics against 
liberal approaches to race relations. The organization also busied itself with more 
practical, short-term problems. Early articles of the JRA, for example, bemoaned 
the low productivity of African labour, planned the development of the border areas 
in the Union, discussed the most efficient method of building African housing, 
examined the utilization of land in the African areas, and formulated the 
llprinciplesll of Bantu education. Suggestions such as these were not just aired in 
publications and at congresses. Sabra ensured that it arranged regular formal 
meetings with top members of the NP government. In a private meeting in March 1950, 
for example, a delegation from the Sabra executive discussed the resolutions of the 
first annual Sabra congress with Prime Minister Malan (8), while the second congress 
in January 1951 was also followed by a meeting between Verwoerd - by then Minister 
of Native Affairs - and a Sabra delegation. (9) 
The findings of the 1951 Congress - the main theme of which was the role 
of Africans in South Africa's industries - seem to have been influential in a number 
of ways. The resolutions passed at the Congress included calls on the Government to 
set up a system of labour bureaux, to make employers responsible for part of the 
cost of housing urban Africans, to train black building craftsmen, to ensure that 
only African labour should be used in the building of African housing in the urban 
areas, and to refuse recognition to black trade unions in white areas. (10) 
Clearly, it would be simplistic to suggest that apartheid legislation and ordinances 
of the next few years were principally the result of Sabra's research and pressure. 
At the same time, however, the organization seems to have had a marked effect on the 
formulation of many of the basic planks of Verwoerdts departmental policy after 
1950. 
Despite its agreement with the NP leadership on many of the short-term 
aspects of apartheid policy - and its united hostility to liberal approaches to race 
relations - at no stage was Sabra free of conflict. The most fundamental schism in 
the organisation centred on the long-term future of the African reserves. All Sabra 
intellectuals supported the general view - and the NP government's expressed policy 
- that the reserves should serve as the political home of the African population, a 
principle which eventually resulted, with the aid of Sabra, in the provision of the 
Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 for the establishment of African tribal, regional and 
territorial authorities. Yet, from very early on in the life of Sabra, some of its 
members began to adopt a peculiarly "visionary" position, which seemed to reflect 
disquiet about the way in which apartheid was being, and would be, applied. 
W E Barker, for example, in the first issue of the JRA, classified "segregationI1 - 
one "versionf1 of apartheid - as follows: 
Segregation is the policy of pushing the Black man out 
of the way of the White man, in order that the 
European can preserve his own racial purity, and keep 
it free from the so-called impure colour of the 
Native. But since the cheap labour of the Native 
would be needed in the European industries, 
segregation would ensure that this labour would always 
be available. When the Natives had served their 
purpose, however, they would be sent back to the 
locations and left to look after themselves. The 
Reserves would only exist as a source of even more of 
this cheap labour, and a dumping-ground for the . 
used-up labour from the cities. (11) 
For Barker, the only "moral" solution to the country's problems was total 
separation, of a ttvertical'q rather than a "horizontaltt form. (12) His call for a 
more ttpositivetf approach to Native policy - and for a concomitant acceleration of 
the rate of development of the reserves - was echoed by other influential members of 
Sabra. Nic Olivier, for example, speaking at the 1950 Congress, insisted that more 
land must be found for the reserves if they were to be viable homes for the bulk of 
the African population (131, and stated at the 1952 Congress that, without 
sufficient land, it would be a ttfarce" to talk of giving Africans political and 
state rights in the reserves. (14) In similar vein, Dr F Language used the 1951 
Congress to plead for the appointment of a commission to plan the economic life and 
the future of the "Native areastt. (15) 
The demand for a more consistent "territorialtt apartheid by the 
"visionariestf in Sabra was closely linked with a grave concern about the 
implications of economic integration. Language, for example, expressed the views of 
a number of Sabra members when he argued that political and territorial separation, 
on the one hand, and economic integration, on the other, were not only "unjust" but, 
in the long run, "untenablet1 (16), a point which was hammered home to Verwoerd by a 
Sabra delegation in the meeting following the 1951 Congress. The Sabra executive 
stated publicly after the meeting that it had expressed to the Minister its 
Itconcerntt over the extent to which Africans were being integrated into the European 
economy (17), and reiterated this position in April 1951 in an editorial in the 
JRA. (18) The Sabra visionaries' attacks on economic integration were delivered 
-
with the clear understanding that, if apartheid was to succeed, large sacrifices 
would be required of whites. Giving evidence before the Tomlinson Commission, 
Olivier was brutally clear on this point: 
Unless the White races of South Africa are prepared to 
make sacrifices to implement a policy of "apartheidlV 
they will only have themselves to blame if a situation 
arises which places their survival in danger. (19) 
Olivierts pronouncements were fully supported by the Sabra chairman, Professor 
G B A Gerdener, who, opening the 1952 congress, maintained that, under apartheid, 
Europeans could not expect to be provided with a free supply of African labour 
indefinitely. (20) 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the misgivings of its visionary faction, 
confustion still reigned in Sabra about the future of African labour in the white 
areas, and the time-scales that should be applied to the implementation of "totaltt 
apartheid. B I C Van Eeden, for example, writing on behalf of the Sabra chairman to 
The Star in January 1951, stated, extremely cautiously, that Sabra did not aim to 
remove all, or even the bulk of, Native labourers from European industry. (21) 
Certainly, Sabra intellectuals seem to have been very aware of the possible response 
by whites to demands for greater sacrifices. In an article in the JRA, P A Theron 
was quick to point out that South African whites would try to maintain their "way of 
life", which was "to a large extent based on cheap native labourt+. (22) Even 
Olivier, one of the most outspoken proponents of total apartheid, in his speech at 
the 1952 congress, was forced to concede that territorial segregation of "the Nativesu 
was a "slow process", which could take three generations to accomplish. (23) 
By the end of 1952, Sabrats confusion about the issue had not been 
resolved. This was clearly reflected in the Integration or Separate Development? 
booklet, the major policy statement of that year. On the one hand, the 
organization's concern with economic integration was apparent: 
The sober  t r u t h  is t h a t  a comparatively l a r g e  p a r t  o f  
t he  European populat ion wants and makes use  o f  Natives 
a s  labourers ,  bu t  pays l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e i r  
welfare and f u t u r e .  (24) 
However, while g r e a t e r  s a c r i f i c e s  were demanded from whites ,  t h e  booklet  was a l s o  
quick t o  a l l y  any f e a r s :  
It  is a g ros s  misrepresentat ion t o  a l l e g e  t h a t  t h e  
in t roduct ion  o f  a po l i cy  of  s epa ra t e  development would 
mean t h e  large-scale  and hurr ied  withdrawal of  t h e  
Bantu from the  European economy. (25) 
Verwoerd, as chief  government spokesman on r a c i a l  a f f a i r s ,  tended t o  echo t h e  l a t t e r  
po in t  of  view. A s  e a r l y  a s  1948 - even before h i s  appointment a s  Minister  of  Native 
Af fa i r s  - he t o l d  t h e  Senate: 
We s e e  two courses,  we choose t h e  i d e a l  of  working i n  
t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of  eventual  t o t a l  segregat ion,  bu t  we 
s e e  t h e  imprac t ib i l i t y  of  t h e  immediate app l i ca t i on  of  
it. (26)  
But, a s  repeated re ferences  t o  t h e  importance of  t h e  long-term apar the id  "idealIt  
i nd i ca t e  - Verwoerd was cons tan t ly  on h i s  guard, throughout t h e  NF's first term i n  
o f f i c e ,  n o t  t o  allow deep r i f t s  t o  develop between himself and t h e  v i s iona ry  Sabra 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  Sabra de lega t ions  were always couri;eously received (27 ) ;  even the  
1951 meeting be-tween Ver-woerd and the  Sabra executive ended with t h e  l a t t e r  s t a t i n g  
t h a t  .the Minister  had agreed i n  p r i n c i p l e  with a l l  its recommendations. (28)  
The statements  and publ ica t ions  issued by func t iona r i e s  o f  t h e  Department 
o f  Native Af fa i r s  tend t o  be more revea l ing .  A t  no s t a g e  during t h i s  period was 
t h e r e  any mentionUof t o t a l  t e r r i t o r i a l  apar the id  i n  t h e  o f f i c i a l  r e p o r t s  of  t h e  
Department. For Eise len ,  Secre ta ry  of  Native Af fa i r s ,  and h i s  compatr iots  - a s  well 
a s  f o r  a s u b s t a n t i a l  number of  Sabra members - t h e  Bantu Author i t ies  Act was t h e  
crowning achievement of  "posit.ive" apar the id  l e g i s l a t i o n :  the  Department's r epo r t s  
were almost exc lus ive ly  concerned with quest ions o f  urban housing, township planning 
and e f f e c t i v e  implenlentation of  t h e  labour bureaux. And, i n  a direct .  repudiat ion o f  
t h e  p l ea s  of Sabra v i s i o n a r i e s  such a s  Olivier ' ,  t he  r epo r t s  a l s o  show t h e  i n a b i l i t y  
o r  unwillingness of  t he  government t o  "consolidate" t he  reserves .  By 1953, 
2,756,668 morgen of  t h e  "quot.a" land designated by t h e  1936 Land Act were s t i l l  t o  
be purchased; and only 232,979 morgen had been acquired i n  t he  previous t h r e e  
years .  (29)  
The response of  t he  v i s i o n a r i e s  i n  Sabra was t o  become increas ingly  
uneasy. Opening the 1953 Congress, f o r  example. Sabra chairman Gerdener ba ld ly  
s t a t e d  : 
Albei t  g radual ly ,  we must be w i l l i ng  t o  f i n d  a 
subs t i t .u te  f o r  t he  present  so-calied cheap labour i n  
-the ki.tchens, on t h e  far-rns, and jn t he  f a c t o r i e s .  (30)  
Other de lega tes  aL (.he congress ,  inc luding  Ol iv j e r  and Language, argued t h a t  t he re  
was no pract.ica1 use  i n  debat ing Lhe a d v i s a b i l i t y  of  s epa ra t e  "Bantu s t a t e s "  i f  
p l an l e s s  irltegra1,i on continued and Afr-icans were no t  pr,evenl.ed from leavi  rlg t.he 
reserves  1.0 e n t e r  the urban areas .  The Bantu AuLhorit.ies Act a l s o  came i n  f o r  a 
measure o f  c r i t i c i s n ~ ,  wil.h some Sabr-a memberss complaining t h a t  the Act had riot been 
based or1 t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  c r e a t i n g  sepa ra t e  Native s t a t e s :  t h e  o b j e c t  of  
l e g i s l a t j  on did no t  appear t o  be 1.oI.al apar the id .  (31) 
The v i s i o n a r i e s '  harangues conLinued unabated once t h e  congress had ended. 
Cerdener followed h i s  Congr.css appeal wj1.h a f i e r y  speech t.o the Afrikaner 
Studentebond congrestj i n  May 1953, jn which hc accused even the most convincetf 
supporters of apartheid of a "fatal dualism" (321, while W E Barker, in an article 
entitled "South Africa Can Do Without Native Labour", in the JRA in July 1953, was 
equally forthright, arguing that the maximum time that should be allowed for the 
imposition of total apartheid was 50 years. (33) But Sabra members were even unable 
to agree about this. Dr J L Sadie, speaking to the 1954 congress, stated that total 
apartheid would not be achieved for a "long time", perhaps 100 years (341, and was 
immediately attacked by J H Boshof who said talk of a 100-year programme was 
"fatall1: a time limit of 20 to 40 years should be set. (35) In general, however, 
the 1954 congress seems to have been a major disappointment for the proponents of 
total apartheid. Minister J J Fouche, opening the congress, immediately warned the 
visionaries: 
I presume that you fully realise that ideals cannot 
always become practical national policy ... So, for 
example, total territorial separation of the races can 
be a wonderful ideal, but to embark on it immediately 
would, in my opinion, be as impossible and disastrous 
as a bicycle ride to the moon. (36) 
Furthermore, with the congress focussing on the question of African labour on white 
farms, the visionaries had to be satisfied with predominantly pragmatic discussions 
about labour productivity and wage levels. This did not, however, prevent the Sabra 
executive from issuing a "serious warning" against economic integration as a 
national policy, in a press statement in April 1954. (37) 
By this stage, any sympathy Verwoerd held for the visionary faction of 
Sabra seemed to have been tempered by the practicalities of government, and he began 
to be more open about his position. In May 1954, he delivered a revealing speech to 
a NP "stryddag" meeting in Vereeniging in which he stated: 
We have set South Africa on the road to total 
separation but it is not necessary for us to attempt 
to reach that goal in our time. (38) 
This was followed, a few weeks later, by an equally important speech to the 
Federated Chamber of Industry in Cape Town, in which he argued: 
... nothing I have said, nothing in the Native policy 
which the government is seeking to implement, need 
create the fear that the economic development is not 
being taken into consideration or that there are going 
to be unreasonably timed changes or that there is .an 
unsympathetic attitude towards the needs of 
industry. (39) 
Then, in early 1955, Verwoerd told the House of Assembly: 
Nobody ever stated that we were able or intended 
shortly or even within an appreciable period to remove 
the Natives from White South Africa, away from the 
farms, and the homes, and the industries. (40) 
And, finally, at the Natal NP Congress in August 1955, Verwoerd pronounced that, as 
far as he was concerned, total apartheid could take up to 300 years to 
accomplish (41). For Willem Landman, one of Olivier's supporters in the visionary 
faction of Sabra, this was clearly unacceptable. In January 1956, he embarked on a 
one-man "crusade" to convert South Africa to the ideal of total apartheid. (42) But 
the schism between visionaries such as Landman and the mainstream of the NP was 
further underlined when Prime Minister Strydom told the House of Assembly in January 
1956 that the government could not "in the present circumstances propagate or apply 
a policy of total territorial apartheid". (43) 
The tone of Verwoerd and Strydom's responses becomes understandable when 
one takes into account the views of the overwhelming majority of NP supporters 
during the early apartheid years. For Sabrats visionaries, the signs were ominous. 
The provincial Party congresses seldom discussed total apartheid in any form; the 
lvbeskrywingspunte" raised by the local Party branches were almost exclusively 
concerned with issues such as the stricter application of "negativetf apartheid, the 
eradication of "leeglopery" (loafing) amongst young Africans in both rural and urban 
areas, and the need to force Africans to pay more for the services that were 
provided for them. (44) In addition, the Party's electioneering strategy continued 
to revolve around nakedly racist appeals. This was graphically illustrated by one 
of the NP's slogans in the Wakkerstroom by-election of 1952 - "a vote for the UP is 
a vote for a coffee-coloured nation" (45) - as well as by the NPts campaign in the 
1953 general election. 
In early 1956 the Tomlinson Commission, set up to conduct an enquiry into 
the state of the reserves, released the abridged version of its mammoth report. The 
Commission included a number of prominent members of Sabra, and its report was 
expected to clarify many of the issues of the apartheid debate. The Commission 
argued that an amount of f104,000,000, over a period of ten years, should be poured 
into the reserves, to develop the ''fully diversified economy" - comprising primary, 
secondary and tertiary activities - needed to support such a large population. (46) 
A Development Corporation should also be created, and white industry allowed into 
the African areas for a short period of time, in order to stimulate secondary 
industrial development. In addition, consolidation of the reserves was essential 
and should be embarked on immediately. (47) 
Significantly, however, in his White Paper and subsequent speech in the 
House of Assembly, Verwoerd proceeded - despite accepting the Report "in principle" 
- to reject most of the substantive conclusions of the Commission. He refused, 
firstly, to commit the government to the figure of £104,000,000 set by the 
Commission. In fact, Verwoerd claimed, the f104,000,000 could be reduced in a 
number of ways. To begin with, the government rejected the suggestion that white 
industrialists be allowed into the reserves. (48) Since the industrial Development 
Corporation proposed by the Commission was rtpresumably based upon the principle ... 
of the admission of large European privately owned industries into the Bantu areas", 
Verowerd argued that the £25,000,000 earmarked for the use of this Corporation could 
be excluded from any calculation. (49) In addition, Verwoerd maintained that the 
f34,000,000 estimated by the Commission to be necessary for agricultural development 
in the reserves was based on the assumptions of the "spoonfeeding" pre-Nationalist 
system of development, and could be reduced substantially. Finally, there was no 
need to spend as much as the Commission's suggested £12,000,000 on urban development 
in the African areas: tlexperience" had shown that this could be done far more 
inexpensively. (50) As far as consolidation was concerned, Verwoerd was equally 
dismissive of the Commission's findings, stating firmly that the ~~possibilities" of 
the existing African reserves should not be "underestimated". (51) 
Verwoerd's response to the Tomlinson Report clearly indicated that the 
government was determined to push ahead with separate development; but also that it 
would carry out the policy without significant consolidation of the fragmented 
African areas or a long-term economic programme extensive enough to stimulate 
meaningful development. This was a severe dent to the hopes and expectations of the 
proponents of "total apartheid" in Sabra. So, too, was the attitude of the 
grassroots of the NP: an attitude illustrated at the Cape NP congress of October 
1956, when a motion was tabled expressing support in principle for the Tomlinson 
Report, but calling on the Government to ensure that Africans also bore the costs of 
their own development. (52) 
Sabrals reaction to the Tomlinson Report and the subsequent government 
White Paper was to organize a "Volksk~ngres~~ (People's Congress), in collaboration 
with the FAK and the Afrikaner churches, to discuss "the future of the Bantu in 
South Africa". The voices of the visionaries in Sabra remained surprisingly. muted 
during the course of the congress, held in Bloemfontein in June 1956. Nic Olivier, 
for example, presented his obligatory defence of territorial separation, but 
refrained from attacking Verwoerd openly, preferring to reserve his criticisms for 
the "opponents of the separate development school". (53) Furthermore, the only 
congress resolution that expressed any dissatisfaction with Verwoerd's policy was a 
short motion on consolidation, in which the government was asked to take into 
account the recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission on the matter. (54) In 
other forums, however, Sabra visionaries were less diplomatic. In an article 
written for the South African Institute of Race Relations in January 1957, 
Stellenbosch University's Dr J L Sadie, who had been directly involved in the 
Tomlinson Commission, was quite open in expressing his problems with Verwoerd's 
White Paper (551, and his warning about the speed of development of the homelands 
was echoed by, amongst others, H J J Reynders of Pretoria University in the JRA in 
January 1958. (56) 
Yet, it is an indication of the conflict within Afrikaner ranks as to the 
necessity, methods and speed of homeland development that Verwoerd and the 
Department of Native Affairs were even experiencing difficulty selling the notion of 
"border industries" to the Party rank-and-file. This was clearly illustrated by the 
extraordinary incident in April 1958 when, after a tour to the "border" areas of 
Natal, Anna Scheepers and other leaders of the white Garment Workers Union asked the 
Minister of Labour, Jan de Klerk, to refuse registration to clothing factories in 
Natal and the OFS that employed cheap black labour. (57) According to the Union, 
nearly 2,000 white workers in the Transvaal were either unemployed or on short time 
because factories had moved to "decontrolledw border areas. (58) De Klerk duly 
closed down a number of the offending factories. There were other signs, too, that 
many of the NP1s traditional supporters were refusing to accept any notion of 
sacrifice for the sake of homeland development. In 1957, a series of articles by 
Fritz Smit - later to lead an anti-Verwoerd "Back to Strydom" baaskap movement (59) 
- accused the supporters of total apartheid of ignoring the fact that the Ifwhole 
economic system" was "built on White initiative and Native labour". (60) 
Significantly, for the local Party branches, sacrifice was not even on the agenda. 
The Party congresses of the late 1950s witnessed a spate of motions advocating 
l1pettyl1 apartheid: from bus apartheid and blood transfusion apartheid, to apartheid 
amongst nurses, apartheid on aeroplanes, and apartheid in dry cleaning businesses. 
By this stage, too, the splits within Sabra, and between some Sabra 
intellectuals and the mainstream of the NP, were being complicated by the 
government's policy towards "Colouredw people. While the majority of Sabrals 
members had supported the Separate Representation of Voters Act, and Eiselents 
recommendation that apartheid be fully applied to Coloureds in the Western 
Cape (611, a group of Stellenbosch intellectuals, in particular, continued to argue 
that Coloureds should be treated as "brown Afrikaners". (62) Sabra's confusion 
about the issue was reflected in the conflicting report presented by the 
organization to the Commission of Inquiry into the Separate Representation of 
Voters Act (631, and was openly acknowledged by Nic Olivier at the 1955 Sabra 
congress. (64) While some Sabra members, especially in the Transvaal, called for 
the principle of territorial apartheid to be extended to the Coloured community - a 
view rejected by academics such as Erika Theron because of the "close ties between 
the European and Coloured people" (65) - others openly questioned the removal of the 
Coloureds from the Common Voters Roll. (66) When the extended battle over the 
Coloured vote was finally resolved in 1956, the Sabra executive formally announced 
itself "in favour of separate group representation for the white and Coloured groups 
in the Cape Province1', but also referred to the Coloured people as "an irremovable 
adjunct of the White population1* in view of "self-evident historical, biological, 
cultural and economic considerations". (67) With the rank-and-file of the NP - in 
the Cape as well as the Transvaal - demanding stricter control of Coloureds, Sabrass 
ambiguity over the issue led to growing tensions. 
The 1958 Sabra congress proved to be important in a number of ways. To 
begin with, the impatience of the Sabra visionaries with the government's attitude 
to total apartheid began to turn into direct defiance. Analysing the memoranda and 
discussions, for example, Olivier stated: 
We do not have unlimited time. Those who think we can 
wait 50 or 100 years for a solution are living in a 
dream world. When politicians say we have 100 years 
ahead of us in which to find the answer, it fills me 
with the utmost frustration that sincere people can 
continue to believe this. (68) 
Equally problematical - as far as the government was concerned - was the decision by 
the Congress to appoint a committee, with Olivier as chairman, to arrange a 
conference with black leaders. (69) While some Afrikaners welcomed the move, 
Verwoerd, in particular, was completely opposed to any negotiations between blacks 
and non-government deputations. (70) Despite a public statement by the Sabra 
executive reaffirming its support of apartheid policy (71), Verwoerd resigned from 
Sabra, and refused to meet any Sabra delegations that included Olivier as a 
member. (72) The Sabra leadership was forced to postpone the proposed conference, 
and eventually abandon the idea altogether, although informal tours to homeland 
areas still took place the following year. 
The schism between the Sabra visionaries and Verwoerd proved to be 
irrevocable. The 1959 Congress witnessed an unsuccessful attempt by Verwoerd's 
supporters in Sabra to remove the visionaries from the Sabra executive (731, and 
Olivier and his compatriots were further alienated when their evidence to the 
University Apartheid Commission - rejecting the suggestion that black university 
councils and senates be controlled by government-appointed whites - was ignored in 
the formulation of the Extension of University Education Act. (74) With the 
introduction of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 - Verwoerd's 
final declaration about the future of apartheid policy, and a measure that fell 
short of the expectations of the supporters of total separation - it became clear 
how far Sabra's visionaries had drifted from the policy core of the Party. 
This trend was confirmed by the events of 1960. Sabra's response to the 
Sharpeville massacre, after condemning the actions of the world press and 
"irresponsible elements1' amongst the black population, was to call on the government 
to consolidate Bantu areas and effect a "balanced economic developmentt1 of the Bantu 
areas as soon as possible. In addition, Sabra argued, a "thorough investigation" of 
the position of urban Africans must be carried out, to pinpoint the aspects of 
policy - particularly those dealing with the movement of Africans, and their share 
in the management of their townships - which caused I1unnecessary friction and 
discontent". (75) But a consideration of these issues was nowhere to be found in 
the responses of government officials to the crisis posed by the uprisings, despite 
further appeals, at Sabra's annual congress, by members W A Joubert and 
A L Geyer. (76) 
Nevertheless, it was the issue of government policy with respect to the 
Coloured population that finally brought Sabra's conflicts to a head. 
Dissatisfaction with Verowerdts attitude towards Coloureds was certainly not only 
confined to Sabra: Dawie, the political columnist of Die Burger, claimed in July 
1960 that there was strong pressure in the Party for a "forward movementI1 in 
Coloured policy. (77) But it was Sabra's visionaries who continued to be most 
outspoken in their opinions. Olivier, for example, told the Cape Times in October 
1960 that the Coloured population should be accepted as an "integrall1 part of South 
African society. (78) In November 1960, however, Verwoerd finally insisted on 
"parallel development'' for the Coloured population; in particular, Coloureds would 
not be allowed to represent their people in Parliament. (79) His firm ruling and 
its subsequent ratification by the NP hierarchy stifled dissent within the Party. 
But controversy continued to.rage within Sabra. Early in 1961, Verwoerd's 
supporters in the organization contrived to postpone the annual congress, due to 
have taken place in Bloemfontein in April with the theme "The Coloured Man in the 
Political, Economic and Social Life of South Africa". (80) Eventually, the 
executive decided to reschedule the congress for September; on this occasion, the 
topic for discussion was to be "Relations between English- and Afrikaans-speaking 
South Africanst1. Between June and August, Verwoerd's followers moved quickly to 
consolidate their position. When the election for executive positions finally took 
place, almost all of the visionaries - including Olivier, Sadie, S P Cilliers, W A 
Joubert and J H Coetzee - were defeated by supporters of Verwoerd. (81) In addition 
the new executive refused to discuss a confidential report - compiled by a Sabra 
commission which had made an extensive tour of the African rural and urban areas, . 
and had been refused permission to meet Verwoerd on its return (82) - in which 
poverty and lack of consultation by the government were isolated as two of the main 
reasons for grievances amongst the African population. (83) In a final blow to the 
aspirations of Sabrats visionary intellectuals, the new editorial board of the JRA - 
for so long a vehicle for the views of the visionaries - announced that it was 
, 
changing the format of the publication: henceforth, no critical in-depth analyses 
of government policy were to be published. (84) 
The picture of Verwoerd that emerges from this examination of Sabra's history is not 
one of the possessed ideological visionary, committed to the total implementation of 
ltgrandlt apartheid. On the other hand, his role was also not simply that of the 
crude "baaskapper", treading firmly in the footsteps of Strydom. For, while 
Verwoerd, certainly by the end of the 1950s, openly opposed the interpretation of 
apartheid propounded by the more "liberal" visionaries in Sabra and the Afrikaner 
churches, he just as clearly realised the importance of ideologically reinterpreting 
the "baaskap1I sloganizing of the early apartheid years. 
The more sophisticated mutation of apartheid that emerged by 1961 seems to 
have been shaped by a number of factors. It developed, firstly, hand-in-hand with 
the rapid urbanization that affected Afrikaners between 1948 and 1960. (85) By 
1960, a powerful, economically ambitious, politically assertive and altogether more 
worldly, urbanized grouping - spearheaded by Afrikaner intellectuals, teachers, 
professionals and bureaucrats - had thrown its weight behind Verwoerd. With access 
to improved educational opportunities, as well as state patronage and employment - 
and with a resurgent Broederbond as a vehicle for its demands - this grouping 
assumed a central decision-making role within the NP, and in the overall reshaping 
of apartheid ideology. 
But Verwoerdian apartheid also developed as a result of more general 
political and economic trends. When the NP government took power in 1948, not only 
was the anti-colonialist movement quickly gaining ground all over Africa; the 
rhetoric of nationalism had begun to influence a black political opposition in South 
Africa that was already radicalized by the rapid dislocations of the 1940s. 
Throughout the 1950s, black nationalists in Africa continued to win victories 
against colonialism, spurring on a militant black resistance movement in South 
Africa. The homelands policy that developed by 1960 seems, therefore, to have been 
prompted by a realization on the part of Verwoerd, and the leadership of the NPO, 
that black resistance somehow needed to be channelled if the rigid control that 
guaranteed white economic and political privilege was to be maintained. (86) 
For the more reactionary elements of the NP's electoral alliance - 
particularly some farmers and white workers - this "new" version of apartheid was 
clearly rather threatening. On a number of occasions, Verwoerd was forced to defend 
himself against allegations that he was a "kaffirboetie" who spoonfed the natives; 
his concern about the possibility of a right-wing backlack was illustrated by his 
introduction of the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill without 
consultation with the NP caucus. (87) Although Verwoerd's leadership was never 
threatened by old-style "baaskappersll, by 1962 a number of splinter right-wing 
movements had begun to hive off in protest againstthe government's granting of 
independence to the Transkei. (88) 
Yet, as we have seen, for the visionaries in Sabra, Verwoerdls version of 
apartheid did not go nearly far enough. At the same time, it would be a mistake to 
suggest that Sabra's visionaries were irrelevant, that Verwoerdian apartheid bore 
absolutely no resemblance to their dream. Sabra was an important organization 
precisely because it contributed towards the formulation of the ideological 
framework within which Verwoerd and his compatriots were able to shape the homeland 
policy. Acutely aware of the turbulence of post-war Africa, and the rumblings of 
black opposition in South Africa, Sabra's visionaries wove the new terminology of 
equality and self-detemination into their language and symbols. Verwoerd and the NP 
leadership, while rejecting most of the visionaries' demands, still managed to 
appropriate the ideological paraphernalia in terms of which those demands were 
,phrased, in an attempt to bolster white exploitation, domination and control. 
The conflicts within Sabra, and between Sabra and the NP leadership, 
therefore did have a significant effect on changes in apartheid ideology. While 
accepting, then, that an analysis of the process of capitalist accumulation and 
class conflict provides a vitally important and primary framework for the 
understanding of South African history, I would argue that it is inadequate to 
dismiss Sabrats schisms over the definition of apartheid as unimportant, on the 
pretext that the ultimate overriding effect of apartheid ideology was to guarantee 
capitalist development. Nor would it be entirely correct to attempt to locate 
Sabrals splits - and the differing conceptions of apartheid held by its various 
factions - purely and simply in terms of the demands and situations of differing 
class groupings. Sabrafs membership remained, throughout the 1950s, relatively 
homogeneous: mainly petty bourgeois and intellectual. On the other hand, the 
prevalent, rule-of-thumb view that ascribes all schisms in Afrikaner organizations 
to regional differences between the "liberal" Cape and the "hardline" North is also 
far too simplistic. Although it was based at Stellenbosch, the visionary faction of 
Sabra found adherents in branches all over the country (89), and clearly could not 
claim the overall support of the supposedly more moderate Cape NP. Finally, while 
the assumptions of the Sabra visionaries were informed by the same mix of racism and 
paternalism as their adversaries - and the same desire to maintain and rationalize 
white "guardianship" - their criticisms of Verwoerd and his supporters were not just 
differences about the most pragmatic, secure way of securing white privilege. When 
the visionaries were finally purged in 1961 it was also because they had attempted 
to infuse an exploitative and oppressive ideology with a consistent moral framework, 
but had failed. 
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